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Notes
Prospeciive-Prospective Overruling
To-day courts and legislature work -n separation and
aloofness. The penalty is paid both in the wasted effort
of production and in the lowered quality of the product.
On the one side, the 3udges, left to fight against anachr6nism and injustice by the methods of 3udge-made law,
are distracted by the conflicting promptings of 3ustice
and logic, of consistency and mercy, and the output of
their labors bears the tokens of the strain. On the other
side, the legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic
advice as to the workings of one rule or another,patches
the fabric here and there, and mars often when it would
mend. Legislature and courts move on in proud and silent isolation. ...
I.

INTRODUCTION

Based on the Blackstonian premise that courts find 'the law
rather than make it,' a decision overruling common law has
traditionally been given retroactive effect 2 since the precedent
*

Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113-14 (1921),

1. The Blackstoman concept has been rejected as an unrealistic
fiction since the nineteenth century See AUSTIN, 2 JUISPRUDENCE 655
(5th ed. 1885), GRAY, Tii NATuRE AND SOURCES OF =H COMMON LAW
218-40 (2d ed. 1921), HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 66 (13th ed. 1924),
HOLMES, COiVmON LAW 35 (1881); Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its
Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 HAXv. L.
Rnv. 172 (1891)
2. Courts generally have not retroactively applied decisions overruling prior statutory or constitutional interpretations affecting contracts. See e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206
(1863), Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 415, 43132 (1853), Farrior v. New England Mortgage Sec. Co., 92 Ala. 176, 1882, 9 So. 532, 533-34 (1890) See generally Snyder, Retroactiv.e Opera-

tion of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121, 131, 133-34 (1940)

The

distinction between common law and statutory interpretation has been
criticized.

CARnozo, THE NATURE OF

THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

148 (1921),

Freeman, The ProtectionAfforded Against the Retroactive Operation of
an Overruling Decision, 18 COLum. L. REV. 230, 244 (1918)'; Note 37
COLum. L. REV. 1014, 1018 (1937); Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 600, 602-03
(1961). Contra, von Moschizisher, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARv. L. REV. 409, 424-25 (1924)
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was viewed as never having been the law but merely erroneous
evidence ot it.3 In this century many courts have limited the
retroactive effect in situations where there has been reliance on
the prior law 4 or where stability was particularly valued.5

Overruling decisions have been made wholly prospective by declaring the new rule of law to be applicable only to claims accruing after the filing of the instant opinion. Other courts,
believing that a wholly prospective application may discourage
litigation of erroneous precedents, 7 have applied the rule to the
instant case but otherwise prospectively.8
3. [It is an established rule to abide by former precedents

....

Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former deter-

mination is most evidently contrary to reason ....
But even
in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a
new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.
For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd
or unjust, it is declared, not that such sentence was bad law, but

that it was not law.... (English modified.)
1 BLAcKSTONE, COMvNTARIES *69-70. See generally BLACK, JuIcIAL
PRECEDENTS, 689-91 (1912); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 170 (2d ed. 1907).

The Blackstonian concept was rejected by the legal realists who
advocated prospective overruling. Levy, Realistic Jurisprudence and
Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-6, 25-30 (1960). See
generally Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037

(1961).

4. Reliance on prior common law decisions is the chief rationale
advanced in support of prospective overruling. AUERBAcH, GARRISON,
HURST & MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS, 175 (1961); Littlefield, Stare
Decisis, Prospective Overruling, and Judicial Legislation in the Context
of Sovereign Immunity, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 56, 79 (1964) (examination
limited to overruling of sovereign immunity); Note, 60 HARv. L. REV.
437, 440 (1947). Reliance need not be proven but is presumed by the
court. Snyder, supra note 2, at 131 n.111; Note, 25 VA. L. REv. 210, 213
(1938).
5. Stability is protected best when precedent is not overruled at
all. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 235 (1965). However, given an overruling,
stability is affected less if there is a prospective limitation. Id. at 240.
6. E.g., Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358,
364 (1932). Application of the admittedly erroneous precedent to the
case at bar is not a violation of due process. Id. at 363-64.
The wholly prospective technique has been criticized on the ground
that the new rule of law is only dictum. See von Moschizisher, supra
note 2, at 424-27. Contra, CARDozo, 55 REPORT OF N.Y.S.B.A. 263, 294-96
(1932); Currier, supra note 5, at 215.
7. Commentators have argued that this fear is exaggerated. See
AUERBAcH, GARmusoN, HURST & MERMIn, op. cit. supra note 4, at 177; Currier, supra note 5, at 215; Note, 60 HARV. L. REv. 437, 440 (1947).

Contra,

Mishkin, Forward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Pro-

cess of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 70 (1965); Note, 46 IowA L.
REv. 600, 614 (1961).
8. E.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). The constitutionality of Molitor is unsettled.
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Recently the Supreme Courts of Minnesota and Wisconsin
have extended the prospective nature of overruling by postponing the application of the new rule beyond the date of the
opinion announcing the ruleY In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, °
the Wisconsin court abrogated sovereign immunity as to the case
at bar and all cases arising more than forty days after the filing
of the instant opinion. In two cases, the Minnesota court postponed the effect of the announced rule until the adjournment
of the following legislative session. Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist. No. 621" prospective-prospectively abolished the
defense of sovereign immunity, and In re Jeruzal'2 similarly
held Totten trust assets subject to the forced share of the surviving spouse.
Prospective-prospective overruling represents a significant
departure from previous concepts of overruling and is an important part of the legal process of those jurisdictions adopting
it. Neither the courts 13 nor legal commentators 14 have extenSee Mishkin, supra note 7, at 61 n.23; Note, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 58-59
(1962).
9. In Molitor, supra note 8, the Illinois court achieved a similar
postponement. Molitor held the new rule to be applicable only after the
date of the final opinion. The final opinion was later held to be that
given on rehearing. Bergman v. Board of Educ., 30 Ill. App. 2d 65, 173
N.E.2d 565 (1961). Since the rule of law announced in the original
opinion was not modified on rehearing, the effective date of the change
occurred several months after the first judicial pronouncement.

10. 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
11. 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962).
12. 269 Minn. 183, 195-96, 130 N.W.2d 473, 481-82 (1964).
13. In Holytz, the Wisconsin court was specific: "To enable the
various public bodies to make financial arrangements to meet the new
liability implicit in this holding; the effective date of the abolition of
the rule of governmental immunity for torts shall be July 15, 1962."
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 115 N.W.2d 618, 626

(1961).

In Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279,

118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), the Minnesota court stated:
The Minnesota Legislature has not wholly ignored the problem.
However, we do not share the view-that a court-made rule,

however unjust or outmoded, becomes with age invulnerable to
judicial attack and cannot be discarded except by legislative
action.
While the court has the right and the duty to modify rules
of the common law after they have become archaic, we readily
concede that the flexibily of the legislative process-which is
denied the judiciary-makes the latter avenue of approach more
desirable.
[T]he court is unanimous in expressing its intention to
overrule the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity ... after the
next Minnesota Legislature adjourns, subject to any statutes
which now or hereafter limit or regulate the prosecution of such
claims
....
Counsel
has assured us that members of the bar, in and out
of the legislature, intend to draft and secure the introduction of
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sively discussed the rationale underlying this new judicial technique. Thus it is the purpose of this Note to suggest and examine the several rationales which may be asserted in its support. First, reliance on prior law, the reason generally advanced for ordinary prospective overruling, will be discussed.
Second, specific references to the legislature suggests an inquiry
as to the relevance of the legislative process.
II. RELIANCE ON PRIOR LAW
Certainly, if it is deemed unfair to impose a new rule of law
retroactively because future litigants may have relied on the
prior law, 15 it would similarly be unfair to apply the new rule
immediately from the filing of the case announcing that rule
without providing an opportunity to adapt to it.1 6 For example,
if the rule creates liability where previously none existed, the
persons who might have to bear the liability ought to be given
time to secure insurance or otherwise prepare to meet the burbills at the forthcoming session which will give affected entities
of government an opportunity to meet their new obligations....
Id. at 291-93, 118 N.W.2d at 803-04. (Footnotes omitted.) In In re
Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183,130 N.W.2d 473 (1964), the court was even less
specific:
fowever, in view
We would prefer .the Restatement rule ....
of the widespread use of Totten trusts we do not feel free to
adopt the Restatement rule without first giving the legislature
an opportunity to provide for it by statute....
The Totten trust is itself a judicial creation, limiting the effect
of statutory provisions ....

It is therefore our duty to subject

this judicially-created doctrine to such limitations as are necessary to prevent the defeat of substantive statutory policies....
269 Minn. at 195-96, 130 N.W.2d at 481.
14. The most extensive discussions of the technique have appeared
in The Minnesota Note, 49 MINx. L. REv. 203, 211-12 (1964); 47 MINN.

L. REV. 1124 (1963). Several commentaries have recognized the technique as unique but have not thoroughly analyzed it. msmnI & Noaus,
ON LAws iN CouRTs 316 (1965); Aigler, Law Reform By Rejection of
Stare Decisis,'5 ARm.-L. REv. 155, 170-71 (1964); Currier, supra note 5, at
214 nn.140-41, 221 n.65; Fordham, Judicial Policy-Making at Legislative
Expense, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 829, 837-38 (1966); Keeton, Judicial Law

Reform-A Perspectiveon the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1254, 1264 n.55 (1966); Lawyer, Birth and Death of Govern-

mental Immunity, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rz,. 529, 539-40, 543-44 (1966); Littlefield, supra note 4, at 72-74, 80; Mishdn, supra note 7, at 66 n.37; Peck,

The. Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reforn, of Tort Law,
48 MnmN. L. REv. 265, 287, 303 (1963); 16 OKLA. L. REV. 113, 115 (1963);
34 U. CiNc. L. REv. 179, 183'n.31 (1965); 35 U. CoLo. L. REV. 265, 266-67
(1962). However, this method of overruling has not been universally

recognized as distinct from ordinary prospective overruling.
MARQ. L. REv. 252, 254 (1962); 42 NEB. L. REV. 710, 719 (1963).
15. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.

16. See Peck, supra.note 14 at 302.

See 46
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den. This was the express rationale of Holytz17 and would seem

to justify use of the prospective-prospective technique in Spanel.
On the other hand, the Minnesota court had suggested prior to
Spanel that governmental immunity might be eliminated,' thus
mitigating the reliance factor.
Jeruzal also presented some elements of reliance which
would justify a postponement of the application of the new rule.
The retroactive application of Jeruzal would have adversely effected the disposition of non-Totten trust assets due to the abatement process. 19 Thus, it would seem only fair to allow parties
to adjust their estate plans. 20 However, since the use of a Totten
trust to defeat the forced share obviously conflicted with the
clear policy of the statute, it could be argued that parties relying
on prior law were not deserving of the court's protection. 21
Moreover, it is clear that accommodation to the new rule
does not fully explain the overruling method of either Spanel
or Jeruzal. The effective date selected by the Minnesota court
in both cases, the adjournment of the following legislative session, bears no relationship to the time necessary to adapt to the
new rule.

17.

22

17 Wis. 2d at 42, 115 N.W.2d at 626 (1962), 16 OKLA. L. REv. 113,

115 (1963).
18. It is arguable that reliance was a lesser factor in Spanel because the Minnesota court had announced several months earlier that
the governmental immunity defense was soon to be re-examined. Reier;son v. City of Minneapolis, 264 Minn. 153, 155-56, 118 N.W.2d 223, 225
(1962). However, it is probably unrealistic to expect a governmental
body to procure insurance against a liability yet to be created.
19. Since under the Restatement rule estate assets abate before
Totten trust assets, the rule may result in "an unintentional preference
to the Totten trust beneficiaries over legatees under the decedent's will."
The Minnesota Note, 49 MNN. L. REv. 203, 210 (1964).
20. Arguably a revocable mtervivos trust can be used to defeat
the wife's forced share since that device was explicitly excepted from
the rule in Jeruzal. Thus such a trust may be used to accomodate Jeruzal. However, since no meaningful distinction can 'be made between a
Totten trust and a revocable inter vivos trust, 34 U. Cic. L. REv. 179,
183-84 (1965), see 269 Minn. at 196, 130 N.W.2d at 481-83, presumably
the Minnesota court will apply the same rule to revocable trusts. See
Oehler, Hennemann, Harris & Hetland, Minnesota Aspects of the Revocable Trust, 8 MiNESOTA PRACTICE MANUAL 15 (1966).
21. This is analogous to retroactive "loophole" legislation in federal
tax law. See Novick & Petersberges, Retroactivity m Federal Taxation,
37 TAxEs 499, 519 (1959).
See also 35 U. COLo. L.
22. See 49 MNNi. L. REy. 203, 211 (1964)
RE. 265, 267-68 (1962).
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND PROSPECTIVEPROSPECTIVE OVERRULING
The Minnesota court has provided only a most general rationale for its position: prospective-prospective overruling was
adopted to afford the legislature an opportunity to evaluate the
problem before the new rule becomes effective. 23 To fully
understand this reference to the legislative process it is first
necessary to discuss the somewhat competing values in AngloAmerican jurisprudence relating to the respective roles of the
court and legislature as agents of law reform. Prospectiveprospective overruling will be examined in light of those values.
A.

THE COURT AND LEGISLATURE AS AGENTS OF LAW REFORM

Rarely have courts clearly explained their reluctance to
overrule well-established case law, preferring to rely on the conclusory phrase "only the legislature can legislate."2 4 However,
several reasons can be suggested. The most persuasive is that
changes in policy underlying the well-established precedents
should come from a representative body. 25 Also, in certain
cases the court may find its earlier decisions made binding by
legislative acquiescence 26 or pre-emption. 7 Finally, the courts
23. See 47 MiN. L. REv. 1124, 1131 n.40 (1963).
24. See Aigler, supra note 14, at 174; Keeton,supra note 14, at 1267.
25. See Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 249, 111 N.W.2d
1, 9 (1961); Fordham, supra note 14, at 838; 47 MViNN. L. Rnv. 1124, 112526 (1963); cf. Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 247 (1947).
26. See Martino v. Grace-New Haven Community Hosp., 146 Conn.
735, 148 A.2d 259 (1959); Schultle v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp.,
352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961). But see Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17
Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). See generally Horack, Congressional
Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 247 (1947).
•One reason suggested for not implying legislative acquiescence when
the legislature has considered the particular reform but rejected it is
that the reasons why -it failed to pass are unrelated to the merits of the
reform. Peck, supra note 14, at 292. See Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14, 23 (1946) (concurring opinion). This view might well be criticized. See Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTION
TODAY- AND TomoRow 12 (1959); Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation,3 VANI. L. REV. 382, 390 n.34 (1949). See
generally AUERBAcH, GARRIsoN, HURST & MERMIN, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 660-62.
27. See, e.g., Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 256 Iowa
337, 127 N.W.2d 606 (1964), 50 IowA L. REV. 226; Fette v. City of St.
Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963). Contra,e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp.
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
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face certain institutional limitations. The legislature may have
facilities better adapted to the development of factual issues
raised by suggested reforms. 28 In addition, the2 9legislature has
a greater flexibility in the fashioning of remedies.
The most compelling argument for an active judiciary assumes that, while a representative body may be theoretically a
better agent of law reform, 30 the legislature cannot 3 ' or will
not 3 2 perform this function and therefore the courts must assume
a dynamic role in the development of the law.33 Furthermore,
court, it is argued
since the legislature can always overrule the
3 4
that the court should not hesitate to be active.
B.

PROSPECTIVE-PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AN LAW REoRMu

Obviously a court adopting prospective-prospective overruling is not persuaded by the arguments for judicial restraint
to the extent that it will not overrule. However, those considerations may be the basis for its conclusion to postpone the
effect of the new rule. Furthermore, since judicial initiation of
law reform does not pre-empt subsequent legislative examination, the rationales supporting prospective-prospective overruling
are narrowed to those which relate to the nonestablishment of
the judicial rule during the interim between the overruling of
the precedent and the possible enactment of legislation.
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
28. See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, supra note 27;
Peck, supra note 14, at 296-97; 49 Mn. L. REv. 203, 211 (1964).
There are factors which may mitigate against this alleged legislative
superiority. Legislative fact finding facilities are generally inefficient
in the collecting of meaningful scientific data. See Peck, supra note 14,
at 276-78. Furthermore, amicus curiae and Brandeis briefs may provide
similar information to a court. See Peck, supra note 14, at 277, 296.
29. See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn.
279, 292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962). An excellent discussion appears
in Peck, supra note 14, at 299-300. The legislative process may be preferable for these reasons. First, the ultimate remedy may be foreign
to the judicial process, e.g., limits on the amount of recovery. Secondly,
the legislature may provide administrative procedures. Finally, the
legislative process may remedy a related area not raised by a case in
controversy.
30. See Keeton, supra note 14, at 1260.
31. Id. at 1261-62. See Hart, Comment, LEGAL INSTITUTION TODAY
Amu ToMomow 44-45 (1959).
32. See Keeton, supra note 14, at 1262; Peck, supra note 14, at
269-70.
33. See Keeton, supra note 14, at 1259-64.
L. REv. 1124, 1131 (1963).
34. Id. at 1263-64; 47 M.
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1. Hardship of Accomodating to an Interim Rule
Courts may adopt prospective-prospective overruling when
a legislative reaction is anticipated. Courts often overrule to
prompt legislative consideration of what the court considers
necessary reform. 35 However, such judicial impetus may cause
hardship when there is a recognized need for stability in the
area of law affected. 36 If normal methods of overruling are
utilized and the legislature does react, stability will be disrupted twice-first by the judicial rule and then by the legislative rule.3 7

By postponing the effective date of the new rule

to the end of the next legislative session this hardship is eliminated. If the legislature does react, the judicial rule will never
become effective. 8 A less significant end achieved by utilizing prospective-prospective overruling when a legislative reaction is anticipated is that of economy of judicial administration, since39 the interim rule will not have to be applied by
lower courts.

The desire to avoid the hardship of an interim rule does not
fully explain the use of the technique in Jeruzal. Since legislation does not usually occur unless supported by lobby or pressure groups, 40 a modification of the rule established in Jeruzal
was not likely because an organized interest group favoring such
a change was not readily discernible.
2. Preservationof Status Quo for Legislative Action
The need for stability may dictate the adoption of prospective-prospective overruling for another reason. As has been
pointed out, legislative reaction to judicial overruling may
necessitate a second disruption of stability in a relatively short
time. The prospect of a second disruption may itself inhibit
legislative action. Therefore, a court recognizing this possibility
35. See Horack, supra note 26, at 390; Keeton, supra note 14, at

1263; 47 iNN. L. REV. 1124, 1131 (1963). While the injustices of the old
rule probably will not cause the formation of lobbying groups, those
persons favoring the status quo will bring the judicial reform to the attention of the legislature. See Peck, supra note 14, at 282, 286-87; James,
Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFFALO
L. REV. 315, 334 (1959).
36. See Currier, supra note 14, at 235-36.
37. Of course this is true whether or not normal prospective overruling is utilized.
38. This is apparently the rationale advanced in The Minnesota
Note, 49 1MINN. L. REv. 203, 211-12 (1964); 47 MlNN. L. REv. 1124, 113031 (1963).
39. See Currier, supra note 14, at 236.
40. See Peck, supra note 14, at 281 and authorities cited in nn.83-86.
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and wishing to promote legislative action may adopt prospectiveprospective overruling to preserve the status quo until the legislature has had an adequate opportunity to consider the problem.
The Minnesota court's indication that it considered a legislative solution preferable 4' suggests that this rationale may
underlie the adoption of prospective-prospective overruling in
both Spanel and Jeruzal. The court's preference for a legislative
solution is easily understood in Spanel 42 since the legislature
would be able to provide remedies foreign to the judiciary, such
as providing for monetary limits on recovery, notice of claims,
or authority to insure. 43 On the other hand, Jeruzal did not
present a situation peculiarly requiring legislative solution.14
preferable on
The court apparently considered such a solution
45
the general ground of representative government.
3. Lessen Probabilityof IrrationalLegislative Reaction
If the court concludes that the legislature considers itself
the proper agent of law reform, the court may adopt prospectiveprospective overruling to lessen the probability of legislative
reaction. Any legislative opposition to the substance of the new
rule may be heightened if the legislature views the judicial
initiative as usurping a legislative function. 40 Thus, legislative
reaction may be in part a vindication of legislative authority.
By postponing the effective date of the new rule to the adjournment of the following legislative session, the infringement upon
the legislative function is lessened because the overruling decision appears designed to accommodate rather than usurp the
41. See note 13 supra.
42. See 49 Mm. L. REv. 203, 211-12 (1964); 47 MlNN. L. REV. 1124,
1131 (1963).
43. 264 Minn. at 293, 118 N.W.2d at 804.
44. 49 MiNN. L. REv. 203, 212 (1964). Cf. Peck, supra note 14, at
297-98.
45. See 269 Minn. at 195-96, 130 N.W.2d at 481. The court may
also have felt that because the prior rule affected the application of the
intestacy statute, failure of the legislature to amend that statute to
refuse the rule constituted a legislative acquiescence.
46. Probably the greatest danger of an active and openly creative reform role for the judiciary is that it might produce or
even facilitate a legislative counterattack by the lobbies and
If revision is
pressure groups that favor the status quo ....
made demonstrably as a function of policy-making, it probably
will be easier for lobbies and pressure groups to convince legislators that they are as competent as judges to make such decisions.
Peck, supra note 14, at 293.
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legislative process. Thus, prospective-prospective overruling
can be used to discourage an irrational reaction to the judicial
decision and confine legislative action to constructive considera47
tion of the merits of the reform.
4. Mitigate Legislative Rebuff
Some courts are reluctant to overrule for fear that a legislative reaction will be viewed as a rebuff. 48

Since the power of

the judiciary is dependent in large measure upon respect, 49 a
court may not be concerned only with how judicial initiative
ought to be viewed5" but how, in fact, it is viewed. The primary
institution for the manifestation of public policy is the legislature.r1 Although a court must necessarily make determinations
of public policy when deciding an unprovided case, such deter52
minations need not be made in regard to a provided case.
Consequently, when a court does make policy determinations by
overruling a provided case, such a practice may be viewed as
presumptuous. Moreover, if the court misjudges public policy
in overruling a precedent, a subsequent reversal by the legislature 3 may serve to equate the latter's view of public policy
with "the public policy, '54 and the concurrence of presumptuousness and misjudgment may seriously injure the prestige of
47. A similar argument has been suggested in support of the normal prospective limitation of decisions abrogating governmental and
charitable immunities. It is argued that the unfairness of the retroactive application of the new rule could heighten the reaction of the
legislature to the substance of the rule. See Mishkin, supra note 7, at 71.
48. See Keeton, supra note 14, at 1263.
49. See Currier, supra note 14, at 238; Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 931
(1962).
50. It has been argued that a legislative reversal of an overruling
decision should not be regarded as a rebuff but that the roles of an active
judiciary and the legislature can be complementary. In certain situations
the need for law reform will not come to the attention of the legislature
unless the court takes the initiative. Judicial initiative is viewed as a
sine qua non to legislative manifestation of public policy on the particular issue of law reform. Thus, it is concluded that judicial initiative is
not antagonistic to representative government but rather is a necessary
stimulus. See Keeton, supra note 14, at 1263-64; Peck, supra note 14, at
286, 292-93.
51. See CAmLL, JuDiciAL LEMGISLAioN 4 (1952); Currier, supra note
14, at 272; James, supra note 35, at 340-41; Peck, supra note 14, at 285.
52. Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 574, 106 S.E.2d 258,
261-62 (1958).
53. At least one writer concludes that courts frequently view public
policy differently from the legislature. Aigler, supra note 14, at 158.
54. AuMMAcH, GARRISON, HuRST & MERMM, op. cit. supra note 4, at
660-62.
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the court. 5
The loss of respect is further heightened when ordinary
methods of overruling are utilized because the "erroneous" judicial rule will be applied during the interim. 56 Prospectiveprospective overruling will mitigate the effect of the judicial
rebuff by eliminating the interim rule. Further, because such an
overruling is a far more tentative judicial assertion, any legislative reaction probably will not be regarded as a censure of the
court holding.

57

IV. CONCLUSION

A recent Minnesota case 58 prospectively abrogating intrafamily immunity between parent and child may be an indication that prospective-prospective overruling has been abandoned
by the Minnesota court. 59 The decision seemed to be an appropriate occasion for prospective-prospective overruling since
it was based on public policy; and it may be reasonably expected that an organized interest group will oppose the court's
ruling. As most intrafamily suits arise out of the operation of
automobiles, presumably the insurance lobby will be interested
in re-establishing family immunity6 ° for much the same reasons
that guest statute legislation is supported by them. 61 A primary consideration prompting guest statute legislation is to prevent collusive lawsuits. 62 Furthermore, it may be hoped that
the driver's lack of liability will encourage guests to protest
acts of negligence.6 3 Although such considerations have not
55. This attitude may be typified by the comment that judicial
initiative represents a 'Daddy Knows Best" attitude. See Aigler, supra
note 14, at 164.
56. See Currier, supra note 14, at 239:
[G]iven this strong tendency to universalize ethical judgments, any application of different rules to persons similarly
situated-when the rules embody ethical values-tends to impair
the image of justice, and to undermine public confidence in the
administration of law....
57. However, one commentator has suggested that the legislation
subsequent to Spanel may have been intended as a judicial rebuff. Aigler, supra note 14, at 172.
58. Balts v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966).
59. The dissenting opinion advocated adopting the Spanel technique. Id. at 78-79.

60. See Pedrick, On Civilizing the Law of Torts, 6 J. Soc. PUB.T.L.
2, 8 (1961) (husband-wife immunity supported by insurance lobby).
61. Wright, The Adequacy of the Law of Torts, 6 J. Soc. PB. T.L.
11, 23 (1961).
62. See Note, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 263, 265 (1959).
63. This rationale may be suggested by judicial interpretation of
guest statutes since guest protests may result in a finding of a degree of
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prompted the Minnesota legislature to adopt a guest statute,
this does not imply that the legislature would not be persuaded
by such factors in the context of parent versus child tort immunity. Intrafamily collusion seems more probable than as between driver and guest. Similarly, a parent is in a better position to censure acts of negligence.
Prospective-prospective overruling represents the most radical departure from what the neo-Blackstonians consider the
symbolic role of the judiciary. Blackstone's concept that courts
find law rather than make it is considered to be a fundamental
symbol upon which the courts prestige and power rests.0 4 A
prospective limitation resembles legislation even more than
retroactive overruling 65 and thus hardly constitutes "finding the
law." In situations clearly involving reliance, the neo-Blackstonian analysis would consider a prospective limitation justifiable. 60 However, since prospective-prospective overruling as
adopted by the Minnesota court goes beyond reliance, the technique is a most incisive example of making law and thus de67
stroys the loyalty that the Blackstonian concept commands.
On the other hand, prospective-prospective overruling may
be viewed as a response to a long recognized deficiency in the
Anglo-American legal process. In many situations the courts are
best able to recognize and fully appreciate need for reform, 8
although the judiciary is not the institution primarily responsible for declaring public policy. And the courts may not be best
able to provide the remedy. 69 On several occasions the establishment of an official liaison between the court and legislature has
been advocated.7 0 Judicial concern and experience would thus

negligence sufficient to allow recovery. II

HARPER

& JAMEs,

THE LAW

OF TORTS 957-58 (1956).

64. See Mishkin, supra note 7, at 59-60.
65. Ibid. But cf. Kocourek & Koven, Renovation of the Common

Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REv. 971, 996 (1935).

66. See Mishkin, supra note 7, at 60.
67. Id. at 66.
68. Green, The Trust of Tort Law: Part II, Judicial Law Making,
64 W. VA. L. REV. 115, 121 (1962); Peck, supra note 14, at 299.
69. See Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 41, 51-52
(1949).
70. GARDmnER, LAW REFORM NOW 6, 13-14 (1963); Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REV. 113, 124-25 (1921).
Although there are many law reform commissions, many do not provide an effective communication with the judiciary. Cardozo considered
this element essential. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 120-21 (1924).
The varying degree to which courts participate is illustrated by comparing two notable commissions. Although the New York Law Revisions Commission must "receive and consider" judicial suggestions and

19661

OVERRULING

be communicated to the legislature for consideration. In the absence of the official communication, overruling of precedent may
be the only effective way to prompt legislative consideration.
However, unlike an official method of communication, normal
methods of overruling will cause an interim rule to be established. Prospective-prospective overruling may establish communication without the disadvantages of the interim rule.
An analysis of prospective-prospective overruling illustrates
that judicial overruling of precedent may require thoughtful
consideration of factors beyond the substantive merits of the
rule itself. Furthermore, it illustrates the inadequacy of the argument that the courts should not hesitate to overrule since the
legislature can always reverse the judicial determination.

"examine the common law .

.

. and current judicial decisions," there

is no requirement that such proposals ultimately be submitted to the
legislature. N.Y. LEGis. LAW § 72. The English Law Commission is
under the control of the Lord Chancellor. See generally Dworkin, The
Law Commissions Act, 1965, 28 MODERN L. REv. 675 (1965).

